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Literary history attests to readers’ ongoing engagement with Milton’s figures of evil, especially 
the Satan of Paradise Lost. Milton’s Satan has been valorized, psycho-analyzed, historicized, 
theologized, and—inevitably—demonized for well over three centuries. Most readers find Milton’s 
Satan unsettling in some way, and our read-ings of this figure have been, and are likely to remain, 
unsettled. But our nature (and perhaps our profession) insists that we persist in our attempts to do 
just that. And while history demonstrates that no such attempts will be (or perhaps can be) final 
and determinative, history also shows that some attempts to do this are more instruc-tive and 
illuminating than others.
Claire Colebrook’s Milton, Evil, and Literary History proves both illuminating and instructive, and 
her work merits close attention from the community of Milton schol-ars. The slimness of this 
volume, with its “mere” 126 pages of text, veils an argu-ment analogous to a “theory of 
everything” argument in the field of physics. If this book had been published by Duquesne, with its 
larger type, generous spacing, and wider margins, it would have easily doubled the page count. I 
certainly could have used more margin for scribbling the many thoughts and responses her 
cogent argument generates. Anyone who wishes to talk about Milton reading or reading Milton 
reading will have to engage this book. For this is the implicit thread that weaves together the 
explicit terms that Colebrook’s title identifies as her primary
engagements: the labor or task of reading Milton, evil, and literary history. She thor-oughly dis-covers 
the complexity of this task, which entails not only reading Milton, evil, and literary history, but 
reading Milton reading evil and literary history, reading literary history reading Milton and evil, 
and—in a figurative way—reading evil reading Milton and literary history. Her apparent purpose 
for discriminating among these readings is to find a way to read Milton other than the way(s) in 
which literary history has read Milton—and ways other than Milton has read literary history—
which in her view often turn out to be the same thing, since literary history shares with Milton a 
penchant for readings grounded in some form of vitalism—and indeed Colebrook contends that 
literary history has been shaped by Milton to do so:
Reading, for Milton, entailed recognition of the eternal laws and forms
of the world along with the ways in which those forms produced dif-
ference, change, growth and history. Milton’s description of evil—as
the negation of life, and as having no genuine being—not only under-
pinned his political theory, his poetics and his presentation of history as
progression towards realization and the full actualization of potential-
ity, it has also governed the critical methods through which we have
approached Milton.
(8)
She deftly unpacks this rather encompassing claim in her provocative and rewarding
reading of Milton and literary history.
Colebrook introduces her argument by defining her three featured terms. Milton
is a “rationalist vitalist” whose vitalism determines his understanding of both evil and
reading. She identifies vitalism as a philosophical or theological idea that posits an
originating force that generates and continues to animate various forms of life, and that
connects those forms of life to one another and to a source of universal meaning.
Theologically, this is the Spirit of God. Textually, or in literary history, this is the ani-
mating intent and purpose of an author. The task of reading for origin applies to the
world, history, and texts—all of which are authored and animated by an originating
spirit. Evil is the absence of good—with good understood as a “well-bounded organ-
ism” that is a fully-actualized self. Evil takes two forms: “the completely enclosed,
self-absorbed and self-consuming body” and the “unbordered, meaningless and
fragmentary night of chaos” (9). Milton figures both of these forms of evil in Para-
dise Lost—“the evil of a Satanic individualism that turned in upon itself and recog-
nized no being other than its own will and force, and the evil of an unbounded and
arbitrary circulating system” (9). Literary History is constituted by reading practices that,
although varying in significant ways, remain commonly predicated on “the capacity
to intuit the spirit that remains through time, a spirit that would subtend all the copies
of a poem or text” (13). For Milton, such reading is “intrinsically ethical”:
the world must not appear as fully actualized and determined, but as
potentially the sign or expression of divine life that remains different.
But if this is so, and reading is always the attribution or anticipation of
what is not present or given, then the text is essentially incomplete at
the same time as it calls for completion. What we must confront, then,
in our reading of Milton is the way in which his own opposition
between good (as expansive life) and evil (as non-relation or absence of
sense) underpins our own literary theories.
(13)
To read Milton reading, then, is to read ourselves reading, for we perpetuate his 
legacy in ways we may not recognize—even those readers who believe they are 
reading against Milton are typically reading Miltonically.
The chapter that follows this introduction, “Milton’s History of Reason and 
Church Government,” premises a critical binary between spirit (divine creation/
initiation) and institution (human system), which often leads to mistaking the media-
tion for what is mediated, or an external law for internal law. For Milton, reason 
connects us to the divine law—natural law—already within us. Colebrook convinc-
ingly demonstrates Milton’s absolutism, but with the caveat that Milton recognizes 
that no human system mediates the Absolute absolutely—such mediation is necessar-
ily partial and contingent. But that mediation may also be progressive both in the 
individual’s regenerate path and in history as it moves toward the end that God calls it 
to. The difference: God has entrusted his divine spirit/reason to humanity so that 
humanity can do this work of fulfilling history, work that God gives to humans, not 
something he will force or impose (as God’s ways are persuasive, not coercive). This 
is why for Milton there should be no state church which tends to rigidify and deflect 
a political and spiritual movement toward God that a free church encourages, reflect-
ing the growth of individuals exercising free will in relation to right reason toward 
God. Individuals must be free to make their way both separately and together—
together indeed because they must do so separately, as individuals (recall the early 
modern meaning of this term as “member of a group”), in and through dialogue/
conversation, not in and through common ceremony and sacraments. Thus for 
Milton reading becomes that dynamic and ethical work required for progress to ulti-
mate fulfillment in the Origin—to continue reading for the spirit while resisting the 
temptation to institutionalize any particular reading that necessarily falls short of com-
prehending its Origin.
A corollary opposition appears in Colebrook’s second chapter, “Capital Time, 
Production, and Generation.” She argues that Paradise Lost pits an economy “in which 
relations are determined by nothing more than competing forces (Satan’s notion of 
God as one whom ‘thunder hath made greater’)” against “an economy of true weight, 
in which something bears its own value and proper relation” (47). Of course any 
economy must work through time, and for Milton time is not simply a sequence of 
events but a map on which one journeys progressively (or regressively, as in the case 
of Satan) toward understanding and fulfillment, toward becoming what God designs 
and desires for his creature. This requires reading signs in a way that places the reader 
in an ethical relation to the sign: bodies are “signs or expressions of divinity,” and so 
“one must relate to bodies not as they are in themselves but as expressions of a spirit 
not yet revealed” (50). This, for example, is how Adam and Eve relate to one another 
before the Fall, and how they must learn to relate to one another again after the Fall, 
and their relation sharply contrasts the economy produced in—and by—Sin and 
Death.
At this point in the chapter, perhaps to keep readers sufficiently tethered to her 
own destination—Literary History—Colebrook compares Milton’s vitalism, which 
constitutes the core of his “radical Christianity,” with that of twentieth-century phe-
nomenology: both insist “that full reason and responsibility [can] be achieved not by 
simply repeating and maintaining the past, but by intuiting the original logic that the 
past could only dimly perceive” (52). Both share a vitalism that insists “that all signs 
and systems can be traced back to an animating, original, and retrievable life” (52). For 
Milton, poetry has purpose grounded in and oriented toward the creator. This is true
not only for individual poets, but also for poetic tradition: “in his repetition of liter-
ary history Milton does not simply include or wander through the texts of the past; 
that past is recreated and activated, oriented towards disclosing its inner condition” 
(57). Poetry may not be for phenomenologists grounded in and oriented toward a 
“Creator,” but their pursuit of an originating, animating spirit reflects Milton’s sense 
of literary history.
Colebrook closes this chapter with an adept reading of A Maske that marks the 
stark contrast between antithetical economies in a way that “foreground[s] the extent 
to which the moral path towards virtue depends upon a certain interpretation of life, 
or a certain way of viewing relations” (59), with the Lady viewing relations as recip-
rocal, rooted in a discourse that reflects natural law and sees “nature as a benevolent 
guide and cateress, suggesting a dynamism and growth” (68). Of course, the economy 
of Comus directly opposes this, and prepares us for the economic rhetoric of Satan in 
Paradise Lost.
Milton’s rationalistic vitalism leads him to reject allegory in favor of analogy 
(except in the one instance where allegory reflects the failure of Satanic reading). In 
her third chapter, “Allegory, Analogy and the Form of the World,” Colebrook dem-
onstrates that Milton differs from his mentor, Spenser, in that he “does not imagine 
good and evil as abstractions which might then be given concrete and aesthetic form–
eternal verities which might then be placed in time. Rather, good and evil are modes 
of life and time” (73, my emphasis). Let’s start with the good. As the creator and source 
of all things, Milton’s God is ontologically distinct from all created beings—a distinc-
tion Satan refuses to see or has become unable to see in his self-entrapment and self-
blinding. Milton sets God apart poetically by refusing “allegory, analogy, and figure” 
as means to represent God, instead “presenting God as the voice of reason”—and the 
voice of this God “is in accord with the very order of the world.” For Milton, “[t]he 
one thing God cannot do is not be God.” God is the only being who transcends 
the need for “a process of becoming to arrive at this or that form of being” (79). The 
result is “a substantial distinction between good and evil”: “good or justice is the 
very logic of the world”—what right reason guides the reader to pursue—and evil is 
a swerving away from this logic, and what we identify as radical evil is making such 
a swerve the ordering principle for one’s life and being. Every creature either 
moves toward its Origin by choosing and becoming the form and being that 
fulfills its origin in Being, or it moves away from its Origin, effectively rejecting its 
self-actualization.
This truth has more than theological significance. If we read literary history as 
just such a process, then “we see all literary productions as figures that stand in for the 
one creative life” (80). The proliferation of figures around the Miltonic “or”—
especially in those extended similes that map Milton’s reading of literary history—
reflect not uncertainties but possibilities: the ways in which literary history presents 
truth cannot be relegated to a single instance. Instead, “[t]he use of ‘or’ commits the 
narrator and the reader to reading, and to intuiting the life from which different terms 
emanate” (81). Such readers do not mistake Satan as an evil, or even an image of evil, 
but as “one possible historical relation to evil” (84). Indeed, such readers perceive that 
Milton has joined in the figure of Satan both the Augustinian understanding of evil 
as a privation or deflection from good and the Kantian understanding of a radical 
evil that claims an autonomy beyond relation or accountability, and so is answerable 
only to the self and its desires. Radical evil embraces a principled rejection of the 
good, or a principle assertion of “evil,” and this is to reject the freedom that makes
self-actualization in the “one living, rational, and vital life” possible (88). The impli-
cations for literary history, and for Milton criticism in particular, are manifold. To 
mark one instance, understanding Milton’s Christian monism in this way implies that 
the combat myth that Neil Forsyth traces in his magisterial The Old Enemy: Satan and 
the Combat Myth may provide little traction for reading evil in Milton’s epic.
Colebrook develops her thesis in relation to Milton’s gender hierarchy in her 
next chapter, “Gender and Contrareity.” Milton’s understanding of gender relations 
reflects his ontology. As self-sufficient form gives shape and meaning (definition) to 
matter, so the organizing principle (the rational) of the masculine informs the femi-
nine: “thus Eve is not irrational, nor is she equal to Adam; rather her being is comple-
mentary and contrary” (91). Despite Milton’s ontological monism, his rational vitalism 
necessarily propagates such dichotomies, and the inevitable dichotomy between origi-
nating, animating Spirit and the matter or substance that it forms or orders grounds 
the gender hierarchy that privileges the masculine spirit over feminine matter—in a 
way that is complementary and cooperative, not necessarily antagonistic (that happens 
only when female matter opts to swerve away from its true being and purpose, as 
Satan swerves away from his—in which case we have an instance of evil as a mode of 
being).
This sets up a comparison of Spenser’s and Milton’s uses of allegory, since both 
“define evil as a mode of male-female relation” (94). The differences in the two poets’ 
use of allegory reflect a critical difference in their ontological and historical under-
standings: “Spenser’s use of allegory means that events within history can stand for an 
opposition between good and evil, whereas Milton will show history as tending either 
to good or towards evil; evil is not a being we encounter within time, but it occurs as 
a failure or loss of time” (96). For this reason Milton favors and employs analogy, 
reserving allegory for Sin and Death to figure a reactive repetition of sameness that 
identifies an evil or Satanic mode of being. Colebrook lucidly illustrates this differ-
ence between Spenser and Milton by examining the style and method in their con-
struction of epic similes. Milton’s repetitions from literary history are not likenesses 
suggesting sameness, but analogies marking possible similarities, and for Colebrook 
this reflects the difference of Milton’s ethical stance. Because Milton believes that the 
world—and God’s relation to the world—can only be “disclosed by relations” over 
time, the world must be analogical: “just as Adam’s reason does not dominate Eve 
through force but is rightly recognized as that which will enable Eve to realize her 
proper potential, so we need to see God not as a force that impedes our reason, but as 
the very being and life of reason” (99). Thus Milton can anticipate, perceive, and rec-
ognize the divine, however provisional and contingent that knowledge may prove to 
be, in any encounter with texts bequeathed by literary history, biblical or not, and so 
even in his own poetry and prose.
But an unavoidable problem remains: the distance and difference between an 
originating subject and the material object created by that subject’s intention and act 
present a difficulty that must continually be overcome. How to do that? For Milton it 
begins with an emphasis on relations that “distinguish likeness from identity” (100). 
Colebrook works this out in a masterful reading of Milton’s epic simile comparing 
Satan’s first entry into Eden with the sailors who delay their journey off the coast of 
Mozambique in order to delight longer in its pleasant, spicy odors, a simile made 
more complex by an embedded allusion to Tobit’s defeat of the devil Asmodaeus (PL 
4.159-71). This culminates in Milton’s insight that “[f]reedom is this delay or ‘zone of 
indetermination’ [figured in the sailors]: a free being does not merely react but decides
how it might act” (102). In opposition to that freedom, or perhaps swerving away 
from that freedom, “the cycle of Sin and Death lacks time and decision, mechani-
cally reiterating the same compulsive reactions” (102); the same is true of the charac-
ter of Satan, who refuses the possibility of becoming other than what he is as a being 
who has spurned self-actualization in the only self-sufficient, truly independent being, 
God.
Colebrook begins her final chapter, “History, Becoming, Reason,” by propos-
ing “to read Milton’s poetics against its governing images of vital rationalism” (106). 
Before she suggests how we might do this, she consolidates Milton’s Christian reading 
of history and the world in a way that allows for its full rationale and effect. For 
Milton the question Adam poses to Michael near the epic’s end—“how can God with 
such reside?”—“is the question of theodicy and politics: if we are rational, if we are 
made in God’s image, how have we so evidently acted in conflict with reason and our 
own good?” (109). The answer to Adam’s question turns out to be love, or charity. 
For the Incarnation and sacrificial death of the Son provide “an event that will enable 
us to develop rationally. . . . Once our reason is redeemed we are capable of deter-
mining history for ourselves” (113). Though transcendent, God works immanently 
within history to make human freedom once again possible. And this paradoxical 
God, who is at once both transcendent and immanent, perhaps provides Milton’s pos-
sible answer to what we moderns experience as “the problem of transcendence”: 
“Not only does Milton posit a truth outside historical conflict as the guide and arbiter 
of historical decisions, he also presents the processes of reading and writing poetry as 
the means through which the restoration of the transcendental will occur” (116). For 
seventeenth-century Christians such as Milton, “the restoration of the transcenden-
tal” is one of the primary functions of biblical revelation as mediated by the Spirit—
the Word now dwelling among humans. Colebrook employs Milton’s metaphor of 
“excremental whiteness” from Areopagitica to suggest that there are two ways that “we 
might think of such an originary whiteness before the moral oppositions between 
good and evil” (120). For Milton an understanding of good and evil grounded in the 
Christian God and biblical revelation informs and supports his own rationalistic vital-
ism, which is both generative of and so analogous to forms of rationalistic vitalism that 
continue to organize and animate literary history and criticism still. Colebrook sug-
gests a second possible way of imagining an originary whiteness: to see it as “white 
light” or “white noise”—“not one term in a binary or opposition so much as a plane 
of differences not yet organized into distinct terms” by any transcendent divinity. This 
would lead to thinking a freedom quite different from—and yet quite as radical 
as—Milton’s Christian liberty.
So Colebrook opens her conclusion, titled “Excremental Whiteness,” by asking 
“[h]ow might we read Milton today if we try to think of the positivity of evil?” (122). 
She follows with a reading of several prose passages from Milton, primarily from 
Areopagitica, to show that his “theodicy, elsewhere so insistently dichotomous, places 
evil here not as the negation or contrary of flourishing life, but as the condition for the 
possibility of distinguishing between life and non-life” (126). In these moments 
Milton provides the way to read his texts other than his intention, to effect distance 
and difference from his originating, animating spirit, and find him in a moment where 
his text, a material object now differentiated from his animating spirit, affirms the 
positivity of evil—indeed, evil’s utter necessity if choosing virtue is to effect a self-
actualization that culminates in becoming all that God purposes. For Colebrook, 
reading Milton in this way points us toward a more radical freedom, a freedom unlike
that asserted by Satan or that rationalized by Milton. In doing so, Colebrook seems to 
assume that Milton’s paradigm can no longer satisfy readers living in a modern world 
emptied of transcendence and the Absolute. But as we shall see in the next volume 
under review, this is not necessarily the case.
Turning from Colebrook’s profound and nuanced reading of Milton’s monism, 
semiotics, and relation to literary history to Thomas Ramey Watson’s Perversions, 
Originals, and Redemptions in Paradise Lost is like turning from a master theologian’s 
scintillating discourse to that of a thoughtful but less critically informed layman on the 
same subject. For Watson is also interested in Milton’s monism and its implications—
particularly for Milton’s understanding of evil—and Milton’s reading of world and 
text, or what Watson repeatedly refers to as Milton’s “sign theory,” which is expressed 
primarily through his typological scheme. Watson’s reading has value—he demon-
strates a capable understanding of how biblical texts function in Milton’s thinking and 
in Paradise Lost.
To a certain extent Watson pursues Colebrook’s thesis in a more limited, sim-
plistic way: knowledge of the typology and sign theory rooted in Augustine’s 
“epic”—The City of God—enables readers of Paradise Lost to “rightly interpret history 
and the meaning of things which had their genesis in God in Heaven through a verbal 
medium”—as creation is effected by the divine word (3). For Watson this knowl-
edge constitutes the path to a “true self”—opposing the false self that results from fol-
lowing the Satanic path. But Watson diverges from Colebrook’s concerns when he 
focuses on how precisely Milton’s typological system reflects God’s monistic uni-
verse as Milton understands and represents it in Paradise Lost (114).
The structure of Watson’s argument is reflected in his nearly seventeenth-
century length title: since he discusses Milton’s epic linearly, he begins with Satan in 
hell and thus with perversions of God’s sign theory; the originals of that sign theory 
appear in heaven and Eden before the Fall; and the redemptions promised typologi-
cally appear after the Fall, primarily in Michael’s revelation to Adam. This structure 
may initially confuse readers who find themselves dealing with perversions of types 
before they have been introduced to the originals of those types. The first half of this 
book reads like a string of annotations to an edition of Paradise Lost, interspersed with 
descriptions of the poem’s action, with a general focus on Augustine’s City of God and 
the semiotics of typology. For veteran readers of Milton the plot rehearsal will prove 
wearisome, but if the text is designed to introduce new readers of Milton’s epic to his 
typology, then the extensive plot rehearsal may be excusable.
Perhaps the same may be said for the book’s excessive repetition, certainly justi-
fied in pedagogical method, but I quickly tired of repeatedly encountering slight 
variations on the theme: “As usual, all signs must be interpreted by the inspired, fit 
reader, who appropriately turns upward and inward, going backwards and forwards in 
time, while remembering the ways and truths of God, thus perceiving the perver-
sions of Satan for what they are” (63). This is no more true for having been said for 
the twelfth time in 60 pages. And the repetition extends even to citations: Watson 
quotes the same lengthy passage from Maren-Sofie Røstvig three times to make the 
same point (4, 107, and 164). The excessive reiteration of points and plot rehearsal 
extending over 171 pages suggests that this book could have been distilled into a sub-
stantial essay for journal publication.
My criticism may be impertinent, however. Watson may not have Milton schol-
ars in mind as his primary audience. Most of the sources he cites are older, before 
1990, with only one source after 2000 (Kent Lenhof’s “Eve’s Aural Conception in
Paradise Lost,” Milton Studies 41 [2002]: 38-75), which Watson cites twice to make the
same point. But my sense that Watson is not aiming for Milton scholars derives from
his final remarks in his introduction:
By ignoring typology, or refusing to see its presence—and the belief
that God, and even, more that Christ, is the center of all, for without
faith in Christ, and accompanying good works, there can be no
salvation—we do not dispatch the anti-semitism and exclusivism that
Christianity has too often encouraged. Only by acknowledging these
negative aspects of the faith, and dealing with them in a sensible
manner, can we move to something better, more ecumenical and
humane.
(ix)
This explains why Watson’s text sometimes reads like a devotional (Christian) book, 
and why Milton’s vision in Paradise Lost matters to Watson in ways immaterial to the 
concerns of many professional Milton scholars. Some readers may find Watson’s 
engagement with Paradise Lost—as if the poem matters in a “life or death” kind of 
way—refreshing. But that will not undo the tedium of the reading experience.
If reading Watson’s book becomes tedious, reading Nancy Rosenfeld’s The 
Human Satan in Seventeenth-Century English Literature often proves downright frustrat-
ing. The task she proposes is fascinating and inviting: that Milton and Bunyan create 
“an archetypal human Satan character” that “serves as a pattern for other charac-
ters,” most notably the speaker of the second earl of Rochester’s poems, Roches-
ter’s “public persona,” and the character of Dorimant in Etherege’s Man of 
Mode—although arguably these three are all the same figure, as Rosenfeld notes that 
Rochester “served as model” for Dorimant (1). Unfortunately, this claim never moves 
beyond the status of an assertion. However fascinating, Rosenfeld finally does not 
offer much of an argument for her thesis, relying instead on speculation, possible cor-
relations (which could move in multiple directions—she too often assumes that cor-
relation effects causation), and reader intuition (and so perhaps the failure is mine).
In this case “Seventeenth-Century English Literature” entails three authors pub-
lishing texts within a period of two decades. And there is no recognition that the 
humanization of Satan, while it is one of Milton’s superlative achievements, begins 
much earlier—arguably as soon as you stage the devil in a mystery cycle or morality 
play, but certainly by the time Marlowe’s Mephastophilis and Jonson’s Pug appear on 
the early modern stage, bookending a sociopath like Shakespeare’s Iago, who out-
devils the devil. In any case, to credit Milton with initiating Satan’s career as an arche-
typal human does not strike me as something new—as Rosenfeld herself notes in her 
chapter on Paradise Regained, Arnold Stein suggested this many years ago (94). The 
interest in Rosenfeld’s task, then, would lie in her making good on her claim that 
Bunyan shares this stage with Milton, establishing Bunyan as the co-creator of this 
archetype, and that their readers—say the Romantics—were mistaken to miss that. In 
this she does not succeed.
To achieve this goal Rosenfeld must demonstrate that Bunyan’s Tempter in 
Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners and Diabolus in The Holy War have the stature 
and significance—and influence—of Milton’s Satan. She does not do this. She 
indirectly recognizes the particular problem Bunyan’s Tempter poses, since he is not 
a character in a story but a voice in Bunyan’s head: the Tempter “tak[es] on the role, 
although not the outward form, of a human; he manipulates the thoughts, feelings,
and dreams of another man, much in the same way as would a political leader or an 
artist” (52). Perhaps, but the fact remains that Tempter never takes on the attributes of 
a “character” in a way comparable with Milton’s Satan. As an allegorical character, 
Diabolus presents a different kind of challenge. He does appear as an acting figure in a 
story, but his allegorical status—a choice Milton rejects for his Satan—limits his char-
acterization severely. In one of her potentially strongest points Rosenfeld misreads 
Diabolus’s “comic” letters to his faithful subjects in Mansoul as an instance of 
Diabolus’s childish humor (this “humanizes” him). But the humor is in fact Bunyan’s, 
as he deliberately sets up Diabolus for the reader’s ridicule, effectively mocking his 
Satan-figure.
The absence of a strong argument makes encountering other weaknesses even 
more frustrating than they might otherwise be. Transitions between paragraphs are 
often lacking, many paragraphs begin with extended block quotations, and too many 
passages consist of several quotations strung together without mediation or critical 
engagement. Sources are cited predominantly to articulate her point, almost as 
prooftexts—Rosenfeld does not put them into dialogue or connect them; they often 
arrive as islands in the ocean of her discourse, and in many instances there are long 
stretches of text where the ratio of island to ocean greatly favors islands (typically 
introduced by “according to,” “in the words of,” and “in [source author’s] words”). 
Sometimes her supporting logic embarrasses: because Satan takes on the form of beasts 
in his entry into Eden in Paradise Lost, we can identify Rochester’s “theriophilic” 
speaker in his Satire upon Mankind as Satanic, and so they join together to question tra-
ditional hierarchy that “us[es] other creatures . . . to achieve one’s own ends” in the 
universe (135-36). In doing so, she reads Satan’s entry into the lion and the tiger in 
Milton’s Eden as a “playful romp among the animal inhabitants of Eden” (136, my 
emphasis). One glaring error marks another unfortunate tendency in the argument—
for assertions to take on the status of facts. In her discussion of Paradise Regained, 
Rosenfeld claims that “[t]he issue of Christ’s humanity is, moreover, even further 
complicated by the possibility that Cain, Eve’s son and thus Christ’s ancestor, was 
fathered by Satan. . . . The  hint that Satan, by way of Cain, is an older relative of 
Christ is significant in any attempt at delineating the fiend’s character” (85). This 
would certainly surprise Milton, who would have read Luke 3.38 as authoritative on 
this matter, and which identifies Eve’s third son, Seth, as the ancestor of Jesus. Jesus 
isn’t in Cain’s line, so the significance Rosenfeld claims simply doesn’t exist. This is 
only one example of an assumption sliding into “factual” status and yielding a false 
perception.
My final frustration with Rosenfeld’s argument occurs in those moments when 
she instances genuine insight but does not follow up. For example, she claims that 
“Bunyan’s ability to create allegorical characters who are at the same time individu-
ated characters can be explained, however, by means of Bunyan’s own attitude toward 
Scriptural language” (64). This is an interesting thesis, and she repeats it two para-
graphs later: “It would not be far-fetched to claim that Bunyan’s ability to blur the 
border between allegorical characterization and individual characters was a function of 
his own relationship to Holy Scripture” (64). Since she does not cite any source (and 
she is thorough about citing sources), I assume this is her own claim, and I’d like 
to see her argument for it. One concluding observation: given her project, I was 
surprised to find so little engagement with Neil Forsyth’s The Satanic Epic, except 
for a few citations that function, like most others, to supply or affirm Rosenfeld’s 
points.
That Neil Forsyth might suffer such a fate in a festschrift devoted to him may be 
more inexplicable. Kirsten Stirling’s and Martine Hennard Dutheil de la Rochère’s 
After Satan: Essays in Honour of Neil Forsyth actually includes one essay that makes no 
mention of Forsyth (or Milton): John E. Jackson’s “The Devil Doesn’t Only Wear 
Prada: Dialectics of Evil in Baudelaire” (in which Baudelaire’s French appears 
untranslated). But if this volume is not consistent in paying homage to its ostensible 
honoree, the quality of its scholarship is consistently high—and I suspect that may be 
sufficient for Forsyth to experience the honor each contributor surely intends to offer 
him.
Three of the essays in this collection are primarily concerned with Milton. 
Richard Waswo’s “Devilish and Divine Economies in (and after) Paradise Lost” exam-
ines Milton’s use of economic terms. He determines that “in Milton’s epic the tech-
nological creation of wealth is always devilish” while “the financial acquisition of 
property and regulation of debts are part of the divine dispensation” (93). But the 
always already fallen nature of language—the inevitable distance between sign and 
signifier—reflects the alienation of (human) being from (originating) being that 
Milton dramatizes in his account of the Fall. Here Waswo’s argument affirms 
Colebrook’s contention that for Milton the reality of an Absolute Origin must always 
be in tension with the fallen experience of the distance of that Absolute Origin. The 
divine economy may effect redemption and close that distance at some point in the 
future, but until then the devilish economy runs the world, “creating wealth and 
poverty, buying too dear the knowledge by contrast and comparison that is all our 
language has to sell us, and that remains necessarily provisional, subject to ceaseless 
interpretation and reinterpretation,” as Milton recognizes in Areopagitica (98). For 
Waswo, Milton’s great achievement was to have imagined what a world where this 
distance and difference do not occur might have looked like.
In the middle of the volume, two essays form a pair of contrasting perspectives 
on Forsyth’s reading of Milton’s representation of God and Satan. Roy Flannagan’s 
“Funny as Hell, or Humbaba to the Rescue” is both a funny essay and a “funny” 
essay; Flannagan writes as if The Satanic Epic had never been written, and he only nods 
toward the book’s honoree by mentioning at the start of his essay that he long 
ago reviewed Forsyth’s first book for MQ. This essay sits in the middle of the collec-
tion as a subversive trickster’s ploy, blithely ignoring Forsyth’s contentions about 
Milton’s Satan and presenting him as utterly unheroic and even as the butt of Milton’s 
joke. Gordon Campbell’s “Godly Reflections” follows Flannagan’s essay, and 
functions as a subversion of the subversive Flannagan, identifying the laughter of 
Milton’s God as cruel. He reads some of the same passages Flannagan reads quite 
differently. Together they provide yet further confirmation that reading responses 
to Milton’s God and Satan often reveal much more about Milton’s readers than about 
his epic characters. Of course this is also the case with Forsyth’s own reading of 
Paradise Lost in The Satanic Epic. I remember my own fascination with Forsyth’s 
description of his experience of Milton’s Satan, so deeply informed by his reading 
of Shelley and Byron. Having first encountered Milton’s Satan without having 
read Shelley and Byron, my experience was quite different, and I wondered as I 
read The Satanic Epic how might Satan strike a reader more deeply shaped by Laurence 
Sterne and James Joyce? The tango danced by Flannagan and Campbell in this volume 
recalls the wisdom of Forsyth’s pervasive qualification in his own reading—the wealth 
of “perhapses,” “mays,” “seems,” and “appears to” that fill the pages of The Satanic 
Epic.
Two other essays, while not focused on Milton, should also be of interest to
readers of MQ. Anthony Mortimer’s “Domesticating the Devil: Cromwell and His
Elegists” examines elegies on the Lord Protector written by four of Milton’s contem-
poraries (Marvell, Dryden, Waller, and Sprat). Mortimer’s close reading of Marvell’s
last poem on Cromwell, “Poem upon the Death of His Late Highnesse,” rewards any
reader who takes the time to read this essay. In “Mediating Evil: The Editorial and
Critical Reception of Shakespeare’s Villains,” Lukas Erne displays superb scholar-
ship as he investigates answers to these questions: “what is the editorial impact on the
mediation of evil in Shakespeare’s plays, evil as it is practiced by some of Shakespeare’s
most famous characters, Richard III, Macbeth, and, perhaps most importantly, Iago?
In the face of the ferocious and often gratuitous evil perpetrated by these characters,
how do and did editors intervene to mediate such evil to readers?” (69). He narrows
his focus to Victorian editors and concludes that “in the nineteenth century, editors
were also guided by moral considerations and intervened in the plays so as to make of
Shakespeare a teacher who conveyed the right values” (69).
All of the remaining essays in this volume instance strong scholarship, but I wish
to close by highlighting three of them. Elaine Pagels extends her own work on the
origins of Satan in “The Social History of Satan: John of Patmos and Ignatius of
Antioch: Contrasting Visions of ‘God’s People.’ ” Kirsten Stirling provides a bril-
liant reading of James Hogg’s Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824)
in “The Devil in the Printing Press,” performing textual analysis very reminiscent of
Forsyth’s in The Satanic Epic. And Adam Piette’s nearly mesmerizing “Beckett’s Eve:
Ill Seen Ill Said and the Miltonic Attendance Motif” strikes me as the one essay in the
volume that most deeply and extensively engages both Neil Forsyth and John Milton,
even as Piette reads a short novel by a modern author.
Milton’s dramatic analysis of the nature of evil in a universe created and sus-
tained by a Christian God who wills his creatures the freedom to determine their own
historical trajectory will no doubt occupy readers of Milton’s texts into the foresee-
able future. In my opinion, that future will necessarily entail careful reading of Claire
Colebrook’s masterful analysis of the relation Milton effects between the representa-
tion of evil as a swerving away from an originary goodness and the representation of
reading as a task of recovering originary truth. I suspect, however, that the future will
supply few readers for Thomas Watson’s and Nancy Rosenfeld’s arguments. As for
Kirsten Stirling’s and Martine Hennard Dutheil de la Rochère’s festschrift honoring
Neil Forsyth, I am confident that Forsyth’s own deeply engaging work will ensure
some measure of future attention to the many fine essays collected for him in their
volume.
